Individual Corruption Cases: A Sample of Systemic Issues

In the past few years, virtually nothing has been done to prevent systemic corruption in Serbia. As Argus learns from the head of the government's Anti-Corruption Council, basic, heavily-flawed anti-corruption laws have been passed, yet instead of improving them, the government has used their shortcomings as an excuse to close bodies the laws have instituted, and to keep the fight against corruption from budging an inch from the start line.

What proof have you for such a radical statement -- that nothing has been done in combating systemic corruption?

Practically nothing [has been done], one could even say that poor anti-corruption measures have only helped corruption. Take a look at the State Committee for Solving Conflicts of Interest -- the law founding the institution was passed four years ago, yet it did not enable the Committee to efficiently combat the very issue for which it was formed. However, when the Committee commenced operation and attempted to surpass weaknesses in the law itself, and to indeed prevent the possibility of general interests being subordinated to state officials' personal interests, ministers began publicly condemning the law, asking that it be changed, i.e. that the State Committee be closed and new, better functioning body formed.

The fight against systemic corruption requires that the well-designed reforms be implemented until efficient and independent institutions begin to function, i.e. until the rule of law is enabled. The way the government is passing anti-corruption laws and founding institutions which it then destabilizes by constant threats of closure, is leading us farther and farther away from preventing systemic corruption. If the State Committee worked for three years on suppressing conflicts of interest, drawing the government's attention to weaknesses in the law which were hindering its operation, and the government then announces the Committee will be closed, then it is very clear that the government intends to keep the fight against corruption from moving forward and keep preventing the formation of stable institutions. The State Committee wasn't even included in the creation of the Anti-Corruption Agency Bill, which, among other things, regulates the suppression of conflicts of interest. Instead, representatives of the Justice Ministry stressed how when working on the law they used comparative experiences, experiences of countries which are in no way similar to ours, such as Slovenia. Slovenia is one of Europe's richest countries, Serbia one of its poorest. Rich Slovenia hasn't had one name on Forbes' list of the world's richest people, poor Serbia had three last year. How, then, can any Slovenian experience be applied in Serbia, and why wasn't the experience of our own institution used, one which for three years worked on preventing conflicts of interest and which a year and a half ago pointed out to the government flaws in the law?

How many topics and individual cases of corruption has the Anti-Corruption Council opened, and how was this received in the public?

The Council analyses individual cases as phenomena of dominant systemic corruption, because we believe that through investigating these phenomena one can determine the mechanisms of systemic corruption and, what's more important, its causes -- legal shortcomings, problems in the operation of institutions, poor correlation of laws. The goal of our reports on individual cases is not to focus on specific state officials or private companies, nor to do the job of the judiciary or police, but by exploring characteristic individual phenomena to point to the structure of prevailing corruption in Serbia. Corruption in our country must be viewed and combated on two fronts.

One is the criminal and legal -- defining sanctions for corruption as a criminal offense and confiscating property acquired through corruption. The second is the one which the Anti-Corruption Council is pointing towards -- reducing the opportunities for corruption by seeing and removing flaws in regulations, and improving the work of institutions. A resolute fight against corruption would, therefore, entail coordinated efforts in both directions. The criminal and legal aspect is very important, but it depends on improving the functioning of the prosecution and courts, and on creating the conditions for their independence, i.e. the building of an integrated institutional framework for combating corruption. Occasional and random police operations -- which the government presents as a determined offensive on corruption, and which the powerful only use to fight one another -- in fact only additionally undermine the institutions, primarily the prosecution and courts, and turn them into the tools of political and financial power centers.

How has the government reacted to reports submitted by the Council?

The Council has never received an official opinion from the government on any of our reports, nor has the government taken a stand toward us as its advisory body. The goal of the Report on Ownership Concentration at the Belgrade Port, for example, was to analyze problems the Share Fund has had in managing public land, as well as the lack of control of sources of the capital used in privatization and appearing on the capital market. However, instead of [the report] prompting the government to examine these issues and search for a solution, the government ignored it, which again resulted in certain persons mentioned in the report leading a media campaign against the Council.

The last report we discussed with representatives of the government was on the National Savings Bank, in March 2005. Since that meeting, the Council has received no feedback on whether the government had been reviewing our reports at all.

Have any legal changes the Council has recommended been adopted?

The Council has on several occasions suggested that changes be made to the Privatization Act, the Privatization Agency Act, the Share Fund Act, the Protection of Competition Act, the Anti-Corruption Agency Bill. We organized an international conference on independent state auditing, where we drew conclusions and recommendations for improving the State Auditing Agency Act. The government, however, did not accept any of our suggestions. Since the Council was founded, several governments have changed.

Has the government's attitude towards the Council changed with the different cabinets?

The government's stance towards the Council has changed. Although there had been disagreements with the cabinets of premiers Djindjic and Zivkovic, they met with the Council, considered [its] reports, voiced differences in opinion, in other words treated us as their advisory body. During the first few months after Kostunica's cabinet was formed in 2004, the government discussed with the Council our report on the Sartid company, only to begin ignoring the Council's work following the report on the State Savings Bank. It is encouraging that as of recently Belgrade authorities have been attempting through the City Attorney's Office to establish legality in the land management of state property at the Belgrade Port - according to information we have, changes to the City Zoning Plan and the dislocation of the harbor will be halted.

What should future cooperation between the government and the Council entail?

If it wishes to search for a way in which we can make good laws and establish fully functional anti-corruption institutions, the government should make its work more transparent, both to the public and the Council, speak openly about the Council's reports on systemic corruption phenomena such as [the privatization of the grocery store chain] C Market and the Port of Belgrade, and seek from us reports on other similar events. By doing this they'd above all earn the citizens' trust. So far, they've shown readiness to speak of corruption issues only prior to elections, which has created a public distrust -- the key obstacle in Serbia's democratization. Eight years after Milosevic's regime was replaced, citizens are still voting not for but only against [a party or candidate], and increasingly so against parties which they had entrusted eight years ago with building democratic institutions, which today are even believed to be working against the people, and whose reign they simply want to stop by voting 'against' them.

If you carefully followed the protests at [the] Magnohrom [factory], you could see that the essence of the crisis lay in the complete distrust the workers had in what the ministers were promising them. Several years ago, the government imposed temporary management at Magnohrom to speed up its privatization, and today, after the company has been completely destroyed by violations of the law and the privatization contract, and after two thousand people have been left jobless, the government is asking the workers to help the company recover by working without wages for a while longer. However, even if the government is serious about correcting its errors at Magnohrom, the workers no longer trust its good intentions, and they're afraid that, as in the previous years, today's promises will only bring a new debt of unpaid wages tomorrow. With such distrust on part of the citizens, any serious reforms are virtually impossible.

Are there any indications that the level of corruption is decreasing in areas where this issue is most present, such as in the judiciary, healthcare, and education?

The level of corruption in any single field will not decrease so long as the causes of corruption remain untouched. The cause of corruption in Serbia is [that we have] the same governing system we had in the previous fifty years. There is still no division of power, the legislature does not control the operation of the cabinet but is instead in its service, that is in the service of party leaders. Parliament should be passing laws and monitoring their implementation, adopting the budget and overlooking how it is being used. However, in the past five years Parliament has not adopted one single final account, nor have MPs, even from the opposition, ever requested from the minister in charge information on how the budget is being implemented, or a report from the budget inspection. In such a situation, when all power is concentrated in the cabinet, and when the judiciary and legislature dare not monitor the cabinet's operation, there can be no talk of a lower level of corruption in any field.

What is the Council currently working on?

The Council continues to analyze the way public land is being managed in Belgrade and all of Serbia, we're attempting to commence cooperation with the Prosecutors' Association, we're analyzing the issue of insufficient control of political party financing, how the NIS oil company is being sold and what arrangements are being made with Russia regarding [the supply of] natural gas. We've also began a report on the operation of certain public companies, primarily the Serbian Railway Co., which is also part of the wider context of political party financing.

Who helps the Council gather information and prepare reports?

According to the decision on the founding of the Council, we should, as the government's advisory body, receive documentation from state organs, and that is most often the case. We also get lots of information from various citizens' submissions and the enclosed documentation. Cooperation with citizens has in the past years been an important aspect of the Council's work, because it has given us good insight into the proportions of corruption in Serbia, and has drawn our attention to numerous issues we otherwise might not have noticed. Occasionally, however, state organs provide neither the Council nor those who submit complaints with the documentation that has been requested, and in such cases we receive significant aid from the Commissioner for Information of Public Significance. The Commissioner is another anti-corruption institution, which the government has begun undermining by denying him proper work conditions and repeatedly announcing that he will be replaced, or that the office itself will be abolished. Still, in the past three years the Commissioner has, through his professional work, managed to earn citizens' trust and has thereby ensured his own independence.

What do citizens most often complain of to the Council, and have the reasons for their complaints changed in the past few years?

According to the statistics on citizens' complaints to the Council, the privatization process and operation of the judiciary have been dominant issues for years. Last year, of the 374 submissions [we received], 125 dealt with the work of the Privatization Agency and Share Fund, and 122 with the judiciary.